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Abstract
Climate models provide compelling evidence that if greenhouse gas emissions continue at
present rates, then key global temperature thresholds (such as the European Union limit of two
degrees of warming since pre-industrial times) are very likely to be crossed in the next few
decades. However, there is relatively little attention paid to whether, should a dangerous
temperature level be exceeded, it is feasible for the global temperature to then return to safer
levels in a usefully short time. We focus on the timescales needed to reduce atmospheric
greenhouse gases and associated temperatures back below potentially dangerous thresholds,
using a state-of-the-art general circulation model. This analysis is extended with a simple
climate model to provide uncertainty bounds. We find that even for very large reductions in
emissions, temperature reduction is likely to occur at a low rate. Policy-makers need to consider
such very long recovery timescales implicit in the Earth system when formulating future
emission pathways that have the potential to ‘overshoot’ particular atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases and, more importantly, related temperature levels that might be considered
dangerous.
S Supplementary data are available from stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/014012
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1. Introduction
Recent research on global climate impacts (IPCC 2007 and
Warren 2006) has produced extensive catalogues of the
potential impacts expected for different amounts of global
warming. Whilst there is no consensus on the precise amount
of warming that society ought to consider unacceptable,
many scientists and policy-makers have suggested maximum
warming targets. For instance, Hansen (2005) suggests that
warming should be limited to less than 1 ◦C above year
2000 temperature, corresponding to around 1.7 ◦C above pre-
industrial levels. The European Union (European Council
2007) has adopted a target of limiting warming to not
more than 2 ◦C above pre-industrial levels. Several authors
(e.g. Wigley et al 1996) have concluded that major greenhouse
gas emission reductions in the near future will be needed in
order to avoid realizing such temperature levels. Such cuts
will be challenging, both economically and technologically—
indeed to achieve climate stabilization, such emissions need
to ultimately approach a very small fraction of current levels
(e.g. Matthews and Caldeira 2008, House et al 2008). Further,
the longer the delay in reducing emissions, the larger the
cuts expected by future generations to avoid potentially
unwelcome change (Kallbekken and Rive 2007). However,
rather than declining, recent global emissions have continued
to grow and at a significant rate (Raupach et al 2007).
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This therefore raises the question of whether it is possible
to temporarily cross potentially ‘dangerous’ thresholds of
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations (notably carbon
dioxide, CO2) or temperature rise before returning quickly to
lower safer levels in the future. Such an ‘overshoot’ policy
might be deliberate, or may occur if society is unable to reduce
emissions quickly enough to prevent a desired temperature
target from being exceeded. The implication is that once at
these high levels of change, society would then act to return to
lower temperature levels back below this target (Huntingford
and Lowe 2007).
Schneider and Mastrandrea (2005) were amongst the
first authors to explicitly consider scenarios which involve
prescribing a climate change trajectory that crosses a
potentially dangerous threshold before reverting back to a
lower safer level. They do this by prescribing ‘overshoot’
scenarios in radiative forcing (thus representing altered levels
of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations), and then using
a simple model to translate this into temperature change.
However, they did not derive the associated emissions and
the constraints that the natural elements of the Earth system
places on reducing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and
so this raises the issue of scenario feasibility. O’Neill
and Oppenheimer (2004), using a simple climate model,
suggested it would be possible to reduce atmospheric CO2
concentrations by around 100 ppm (from maximum levels
between 600 and 800 ppm) over approximately 60–80 years,
corresponding to a fall in temperature of around 0.5 ◦C during
this time. Recently, Wigley et al (2007) did examine a set
of concentration overshoot pathways, again with a simple
model, and derived both the future temperature rise and most
importantly the greenhouse gas emissions that would lead to
the given pathways (but without a treatment of climate and
carbon cycle uncertainty). They demonstrate that recovery
to lower temperatures within a century timescale is difficult.
In fact, the overshoot scenario considered by Wigley et al
(2007) may, for a period, require negative global emissions
of CO2. The linkage between concentration and temperature
overshoot trajectories and emissions scenarios depends on
key uncertainties of the climate system, especially, climate
sensitivity and ocean heat uptake (Knutti et al 2005). The
linkages also depend on the still uncertain climate–carbon
cycle feedback, which has been investigated for ‘business-as-
usual’ scenarios with large increases in emissions (e.g. Cox
et al 2000, Friedlingstein et al 2006). However, there has been
much less emphasis on studying this feedback in scenarios with
large reductions in future emissions. Matthews and Caldeira
(2008) did examine scenarios with large future emissions cuts
using a single Earth system model of intermediate complexity
(EMIC) and they found that near-zero emissions were required
to stabilize atmospheric near-surface temperature. It can be
inferred that if extremely low emissions are needed for climate
stabilization, then even lower (or zero) emissions will probably
correspond to only very slow rates of recovery in global
temperature.
Working Group 1 of the IPCC fourth assessment report
provides only limited coverage of this type of ‘overshoot’
scenario. For instance, Meehl et al (2007) reported an
experiment by Tsutsui et al (2007) that prescribed reductions
in atmospheric CO2 concentrations by around 150 ppm over
100 years, and the associated derived temperature response
gave a reduction of around 1 ◦C. While this used a complex
climate model (the community climate system model), driving
the model with prescribed CO2 concentrations again raises
the question of whether such rapid reductions are actually
feasible in terms of emissions. Meehl et al (2007) also
reported (in their figure 10.35) the results from five EMICs,
and this same experiment set was analysed more fully later
in Plattner et al (2008). These authors used a scenario
with emissions set to zero at 2100, by which time the
atmospheric CO2 concentration had reached between 650 and
700 ppm. Immediately following this extreme emissions
reduction, atmospheric CO2 concentration fell by only 50–
100 ppm over 100 years. Further, between 2100 and 2300
the global average surface temperature levelled out in two
of the models and began decreasing slightly in the other
three. Finally, Solomon et al (2009) also used an EMIC
to derive long-term CO2 and temperature response following
emissions being set to zero. Their model also attempted
to capture expected precipitation changes using a ‘pattern
scaling’ method, although caution should be exercised as this
methodology requires verification for long periods of slowly
declining temperature.
The implications of this very slow rate of atmospheric
CO2 and temperature reduction for such a drastic emissions cut
have considerable implications for the climate change debate.
Unfortunately still missing in the numerical experiments
performed to date that depict ‘overshoot’ scenarios is a
coupled (interactive) treatment of the climate system and
carbon cycle response using the sufficiently complex process
representations only found in general circulation models
(GCMs). Many also lack an up-to-date treatment of the
combined uncertainties in the climate system and its interaction
with the carbon cycle.
GCMs capture climate processes on both relatively fine
spatial scales (typically a few hundred kilometres) and
temporal scales, and remain the mainstay of projections of
future climate change. EMICs do represent some, but not
all, of the processes explicitly represented in GCMs although
often at a lower resolution. Simple climate models, by
definition, aggregate all such processes affecting evolution of
the Earth system to much larger, often global average, scales.
However these processes, such as atmospheric circulation, the
hydrological cycle, oceanic functioning and all interactions
within the carbon cycle do exhibit significant geographical
variation in their perturbations within a changing climate.
It is, therefore, prudent to check that spatially aggregated
parameterizations in simpler models remain valid when forced
by a range of anthropogenic emissions, especially for more
novel situations such as ‘overshoot’ where potential (regional)
hysteresis effects may be important. The penalty is that
GCMs require a massive computational overhead, and despite
advances in computational power, long century timescale
simulations still need several months to complete. Hence,
only a relatively few long GCM simulations are possible. It
is in this context that simple models do remain useful in
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providing measures of uncertainty given their capability to
rapidly make long simulations. However, this should only
be done where the simple model has some demonstrated skill
in replicating the simulations that exist by more complex
GCMs.
In this letter we investigate the issue of recovery time
in overshoot scenarios in much greater depth. The first
part of our study uses a version of the Hadley Centre
GCM to investigate, for the first time, the robustness of
previous predictions by simple models and EMICs and explore
the mechanisms/processes behind the very slow temperature
recovery rates following dramatic reduction of emissions in
future (highly idealized) CO2 scenarios. The second part of
our work uses a simple model to estimate uncertainty on our
conclusions and also to extend them to a more policy relevant
scenario, and where such a scenario also includes the impact
of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols.
2. Methods
The complex GCM with carbon cycle that we employ here is
the HadCM3LC model. The simple climate model we use is a
version of the MAGICC model, with parameters representing
the aggregated behaviour of a range of more complex climate
models (both EMIC and GCMs).
2.1. GCMs
The HadCM3LC model (Cox et al 2000) couples a version
of the Hadley ocean–atmosphere GCM (HadCM3) (Gordon
et al 2000, Pope et al 2000) to an ocean carbon cycle
model (Palmer and Totterdell 2001) and a terrestrial carbon
cycle model (Cox 2001). The terrestrial carbon cycle model
TRIFFID simulates growth of, and competition between, five
vegetation plant functional types: broadleaf trees, needleleaf
trees, C3 grasses, C4 grasses and shrubs. Stomatal conductance
and photosynthesis are calculated using a coupled leaf-level
model (Cox et al 1998). The ocean carbon cycle model
represents four biological components, a single class of
phytoplankton, a single class of zooplankton, detritus and
nutrient, along with dissolved inorganic carbon and alkalinity.
As well as interacting within the biological model, each
of these components describing the ocean carbon cycle are
advected around the ocean by the modelled oceanic physics.
The horizontal resolution of HadCM3LC is 2.5◦ latitude by
3.75◦ longitude with 19 levels in the atmosphere and 20
levels in the ocean. Because our focus is on changes over
time periods of a few hundred years it is not necessary to
include very long timescale features of the global carbon
cycle, such as a treatment of rock weathering or carbon
sedimentation (e.g. Archer 2005). Before making simulations
corresponding to prescribed emission scenarios, HadCM3LC
is spun up to achieve an initial stable state representative
of pre-industrial climate conditions. Specifically the GCM
is forced with prescribed pre-industrial levels of atmospheric
CO2 concentration, and until a situation is reached whereby
net land–atmosphere and ocean–atmospheric fluxes of CO2 are
negligible.
2.2. Simple climate model
The MAGICC climate model has been used extensively to
make climate projections, including use in the IPCC third
and fourth assessments (Cubasch et al 2001, Meehl et al
2007). It has previously been tuned to credibly reproduce
the global mean temperature results of seven atmosphere–
ocean GCMs (AOGCMs) (Raper and Cubasch 1996, Raper
et al 2001, Cubasch et al 2001). The carbon cycle (Wigley
1993) in MAGICC can emulate the Bern-CC and ISAM
model results over the range of the SRES scenarios. In our
analysis we use a version of the MAGICC simple climate
model to simulate the global average near-surface warming
and its uncertainty for each of our new emissions trajectories.
The three specific parameters that we varied are the climate
sensitivity (defined as the equilibrium global mean temperature
increase for a doubling of atmospheric CO2), the ocean mixing
rate (which determines how quickly the warming at the surface
is diffused throughout the ocean), and a new climate–carbon
cycle feedback factor (which either amplifies or suppresses
the temperature dependent climate–carbon cycle feedbacks
already prescribed in version 4 of MAGICC). Warren et al
(2009) show that there are particular combinations of these
three parameters that enable MAGICC to closely emulate the
atmospheric CO2 change and global average surface warming
of the 11 models (forced for SRES A2 emissions scenario) that
took part in the C4MIP study (Friedlingstein et al 2006).
In our analysis, uncertainty was incorporated into
our simulations by sampling parameter values from range
estimates of the three parameters discussed above. For
climate sensitivity we draw on a widely-used probability
distribution of Murphy et al (2004), which has a modal
value of approximately 3.2 ◦C. A log normal distribution of
ocean mixing rates, with a modal value of 2.04 cm2 s−1, was
derived following Wigley and Raper (2001) based on a fit
to the AOGCMs employed by Cubasch et al (2001). The
climate–carbon cycle amplification parameter follows a normal
distribution whose mean and standard deviation was based on
the fitting of MAGICC to the C4MIP ensemble. The three
parameter values were selected by dividing the uncertainty
ranges into nine bins, each of which is associated with a
probability from the distributions. A probability estimate for
each possible triplet of parameters (729 sets of values) was then
derived by multiplying together these individual probabilities.
For our new ‘overshoot’ scenarios, all 729 possible simulations
were performed for each scenario.
2.3. Experimental design
We used four scenarios in this work, all following historic
emission estimates up to year 2000 followed by the SRES A2
emissions (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000) until at least 2010.
The first three scenarios comprised a set of highly
idealized emission reduction experiments. In experiments
named 2012E0, 2050E0 and 2100E0 the emissions followed
SRES A2 values until being set to zero for the next 100 years
at years 2012, 2050 or 2100. This set of emissions was
supplied to both the complex model, HadCM3LC, and to the
probabilistic version of the MAGICC model. While society is
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almost certainly not going to reduce CO2 emissions to zero on
such short timescales, the purpose of these experiments is to
show the overall constraints on concentration and temperature
reduction inherent in the climate system. For simplicity, non-
CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosol forcings were omitted from
these three scenarios. The simulations with MAGICC were
extended to year 2500 (with emissions remaining at zero)
but computational constraints meant this was not possible
with HadCM3LC. As both models overlap for at least part
of the scenarios, this allows us to estimate whether the
simple model has credibility in the zero emissions section
of the scenario several decades after it deviates from the
original scenario (i.e. SRES A2). This model equivalence for
these new emission scenarios cannot be assumed as climate
sensitivity estimates used in the simple model were derived
from an experiment in which atmospheric CO2 concentration
was doubled, whilst the carbon cycle climate feedback
amplification parameter was derived from model comparisons
with ‘business-as-usual’ SRES A2 emissions.
Our fourth emissions scenario was less idealized and
additionally included forcing from other greenhouse gases,
the non-CO2 Kyoto gases, the Montreal protocol gases and
atmospheric pollutants including sulfate aerosol particles. This
scenario was only used with the simple climate model. Called
2010P3, emissions deviated from SRES A2 at 2010, peaking
five years later in 2015, and then reducing at an increasing
rate until a long-term compound rate of reduction of 3% per
annum is reached. This compound rate was then applied for
the rest of the numerical experiment, which, for consistency
with the other scenarios ends in 2500. The reduction in CO2
equivalent emissions5 in 2010P3 are around 47% of the 1990
value by 2050. Sulfate aerosol ‘emissions’ are linearly reduced
to zero from the projected 2010 value, and over a period of
50 years. As a sensitivity experiment we have also performed
variants of the 2010P3 experiment in which sulfate emissions
were reduced over a shorter 25 year period or a longer 100 year
period.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. General circulation model simulations
When the CO2 component of the SRES A2 emissions scenario
is used to force the HadCM3LC GCM for a period up to the
end of the 21st century, then the atmospheric concentration
of carbon dioxide is projected to exceed 1000 ppm at 2100.
Following the emissions being set to zero in the 2012E0
experiment (at a CO2 concentration around 404 ppm), the
2050E0 experiment (at a CO2 concentration around 556 ppm)
and the 2100E0 experiment, HadCM3LC simulates very
low rates of decline in atmospheric CO2 concentration.
Mean (regressed) rates of change for the following hundred
years are predicted as −0.2 ppm y−1, −0.4 ppm y−1 and
−0.75 ppm y−1, respectively (see figure 1 upper panel). The
magnitudes of these rates of reduction are all considerably
5 The CO2 equivalent emissions were estimated for the combined emissions




Figure 1. Projected atmospheric CO2 concentration (upper panel)
and temperature increase above pre-industrial levels (lower panel)
simulated with the HadCM3LC model. The black curves show the
SRES A2 (CO2 only) emissions forcing reference case. The green,
blue and orange curves show the mitigation experiments in which
emissions were zeroed at years 2012 (scenario ‘2012E0’), 2050
(‘2050E0’) or 2100 (‘2100E0’).
smaller than that of the current rate of increase in atmospheric
CO2 concentrations (known to be around +2 ppm y−1) and less
than 12% of the magnitude of the HadCM3LC modelled 21st
century average rate of increase for the SRES A2 simulation.
The associated projected future global average surface
temperatures from the HadCM3LC experiments are shown
in figure 1 (lower panel). By the time emissions are set to
zero in the 2050E0 experiment, simulated temperature has
already exceeded 2 ◦C above pre-industrial levels. Thereafter
there is actually a slight trend of continued warming (around
0.2 ◦C/century) implying temperatures would remain at more
than 2 ◦C for at least a century, and possibly much longer.
We analyse the simulated mechanisms in HadCM3LC of
the removal of atmospheric CO2 for the three century long
model runs following cessation of emissions. In the 2012E0
experiment CO2 was removed from the atmosphere over the
subsequent century by a combination of uptake by the land
and ocean in a ratio of approx 1 : 2 (23 GtC and 54 GtC
respectively, as shown in figure 2). The relatively small degree
of climate change that had occurred by this time meant that
the terrestrial biosphere was still acting as a carbon sink (due
to increased CO2 fertilization of plant growth outweighing any
temperature-increased plant or soil respiration). For the ocean,
the increased atmospheric CO2 concentration was driving
modest absorption. However in 2050E0 and 2100E0 the
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere in the century after the
emissions were zeroed was driven by a quite different balance
of processes. The higher levels of CO2 drove increasing uptake
by the ocean, which more than offset any potential reduction
due to increasing ocean temperatures (higher temperatures can
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Figure 2. Cumulative natural carbon uptake split by land (left-hand
bars) and ocean (right-hand bars) in the 100 years following cessation
of emissions in the 2012E0, 2050E0 and 2100E0 experiments.
Negative values imply a natural source of CO2 in to the atmosphere.
reduce the solubility of carbon dioxide into the mixed layer
and uptake due to mixing of carbon into the deeper ocean,
reducing potential ‘draw-down’ of atmospheric CO2 (Prentice
et al 2001, Sarmiento et al 1998). However what is noteworthy
for these two scenarios is that the warmer global temperature
(accompanied by precipitation changes) meant that, averaged
globally, the terrestrial biosphere was unable to act as a sink of
carbon. There is a modelled net terrestrial loss of 50 GtC and
76 GtC respectively over the 100 years following a cessation
of emissions.
More details of this terrestrial vegetation and soil carbon
exchange during the zero emissions periods are shown in
figure 3. In the 2012E0 case both the tropical and extra-tropical
land regions continue to absorb carbon. In the 2050E0 case
there is an extra-tropical sink due to enhanced boreal forest
growth, but this is smaller than the tropical carbon loss from
both vegetation biomass and soil organic material (respiration
increase for this region is larger than any CO2-fertilisation
effect). In 2100E0 carbon loss from northern soils also now
outweighs biomass gain and hence the extra-tropics as well as
the tropics are predicted to be a carbon source.
A particular example of regional carbon cycle changes,
which is present in both the 2050E0 and 2100E0 experiments
is the simulated die-back of the Amazonian forest. This
continues long after the emissions have been set to zero,
and can be described as an ‘ecosystem change commitment’
(Jones et al 2009). The mechanisms for Amazon die-back in
HadCM3LC are discussed in Betts et al (2004) and Cox et al
(2004), and are found to be forced by movement in the Atlantic
inter-tropical convergence zone (ITCZ) (Good et al 2009).
Here we have, for the first time using the most complex
class of Earth system model, a coupled climate–carbon cycle
GCM, demonstrated that only very low rates of temperature
reduction follow even massive reductions in emissions. This
is in agreement with the general conclusions from the work
of, for example, Plattner et al (2008), Matthews and Caldeira
(2008) and Solomon et al (2009). However, this could not have
been assumed a priori because many detailed long-term carbon
cycle changes and their meteorological forcings (as highlighted
by the discussion of both the tropics/extra-tropics split in
a)
b)
Figure 3. Cumulative carbon uptake by the land biosphere in the
100 years following cessation of emissions, split into soil carbon
storage (left-hand bars) and increase in vegetation biomass
(right-hand bars). Tropics (30◦S–30◦N; top panel), extra-tropics
(outside 30◦S–30◦N; bottom panel). Negative values imply a natural
source of CO2 into the atmosphere.
terrestrial carbon store behaviour, and projected Amazonian
‘die-back’) might not be present in EMICs or simple climate
models.
We can make a direct comparison against one of the recent
Solomon et al (2009) scenarios (the zeroing of emissions from
550 ppm) to our 2050E0 experiment (which zeroes emissions
from a concentration of 556 ppm). In the former, the EMIC-
derived CO2 concentration falls by around 100 ppm in the 100
years following emission reductions, compared to a 40 ppm
drop in our GCM simulation. During the same period the
temperature in the Solomon et al (2009) experiment falls by
around 0.1–0.2 ◦C but in our experiment it actually rises by
0.2 ◦C. However, whilst individual GCMs and EMICs allow
us to investigate the processes that govern the slow climate
response following a reduction in emissions, an ensemble of
models is needed to span the range of plausible response times.
In section 3.2 we attempt to provide uncertainty bounds on
the time global average temperature is likely to remain above
various target temperatures. We also extend the results to
an emission scenario that has a higher level of likely policy
realism.
5
Environ. Res. Lett. 4 (2009) 014012 J A Lowe et al
3.2. Uncertainty analysis and policy relevant scenario
In this section we make use of large ensembles of MAGICC
simulations for each emissions profile of interest. An initial
task is to establish whether MAGICC has credibility at
representing more complex models in scenarios with rapid
reductions in emissions. The range of temperatures (relative
to pre-industrial) during the period 2050–2150 projected by
HadCM3LC for scenario 2050E0 is 1.65–2.5 ◦C. The spread
is caused by natural variability in the GCM and the small
upward trend in temperature. If we select the particular
MAGICC version that has the best fit to HadCM3LC in the
SRES A2 scenario we find this projects a temperature rise
of 2.15 ◦C for 2100 for 2050E0 emissions. Because the
MAGICC result lies within the bounds of the projections from
HadCM3LC decades after the cut to zero emissions, we can
have some confidence that the simple model can replicate the
complex GCM in aggressive mitigation scenarios even though
its parameters were derived from experiments that used very
different emissions pathways.
Having established at a basic level that the MAGICC
model has some predictive skill for scenarios with significant
mitigation, we consider the probability estimates from our
full ensemble of simple models as the warming evolves over
time. The three cumulative distributions in figure 4 describe
the probability of various amount of future warming in the
2050E0 scenario for years 2050, 2100 and 2200. By 2100
the median warming is around 1.8 ◦C, and the probability of
exceeding 2 ◦C is around 40%. The probability of exceeding
3 ◦C by this time is a little less than 5%. A particularly
interesting feature of this plot is that the cumulative distribution
functions cross over each other. This implies that as time
passes following the cut to zero emissions, the probability of
exceeding the higher temperatures (>2.5 ◦C) actually increases
as some model variants continue to warm. However, the
probability of exceeding lower temperatures (<2 ◦C) becomes
less as time progresses. This is because there are some simple
model variants (typically those with lower climate sensitivity
and faster response time) that have already reached their peak
temperature and begun to cool. The cumulative distribution
functions for the warming to 2100 for the 2050E0, 2100E0 and
2010P3 scenarios are compared in the supplementary material,
available from stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/014012.
Because figure 4 shows that some of our simulations
exhibit temperature peaking behaviour, we now focus on
the possible length of time for which the global average
temperature overshoots various temperature thresholds. These
thresholds are selected as 1.7 ◦C (based on Hansen 2005), 2 ◦C
(based on the EU target) and 3 ◦C above the pre-industrial
levels. Using the ensemble of MAGICC simulations and
associated probabilities for each run, the left-hand panels of
figure 5 show the evolution over time of the probability of
exceeding the various temperature targets. The results from
the idealized CO2-only scenarios (2050E0 and 2100E0) are
shown alongside those from the more policy relevant multi-gas
2010P3 experiment. The right-hand panels of figure 5 shows
the cumulative probability of being over various temperature
thresholds for a given length of time. For the 2010P3
experiment there is around a 55% chance that the temperature
Figure 4. Cumulative probability of exceeding particular
temperature levels at 2050, 2100 and 2200 in the 2050E0 scenario.
peaks above 2 ◦C, and around a 30% (20%) chance that it stays
above 2 ◦C for at least 100 (200) years.
A further interesting feature of figure 5, seen most clearly
in the time spent over 1.7 or 2 ◦C, is that whilst the probability
of staying over this temperature target for less than a century
is greater in the 2010P3 case than in the 2050E0 case, the
reverse is true for overshoot times of more than a century.
Initially, this seems counter intuitive because 2010P3 still
has emissions beyond 2050, albeit at a diminishing rate.
The main reason for this behaviour is that although the
2010P3 simulation has a higher radiative forcing earlier in the
simulation (before 2050) this is due to it having a large non-
CO2 greenhouse gas composition. Following 2050, due to the
shorter atmospheric lifetimes of these gases, radiative forcing
in the 2010P3 falls more quickly despite these simulations
having non-zero emissions beyond year 2050. A smaller
secondary reason is that there are slight differences in carbon
uptake due to different carbon cycle climate feedback in the
different warming and fertilization pathways taken by the two
experiments earlier in the simulations. The consequence of
these combined effects is that the probability of being over the
2 ◦C target for more than 400 years is only around 6% for the
multi-gas 2010P3 scenario but is almost three times bigger for
2050E0, despite 2010P3 having a greater probability of going
over 2 ◦C earlier in the simulation.
3.3. Sensitivity of results to aerosol forcing scenario
One of our key assumptions in the 2010P3 scenario is the
rate at which sulfate emissions are reduced following the start
of mitigation. The short lifetime of sulfate aerosols in the
atmosphere means that the radiative forcing associated with
sulfates reduces to zero over approximately the same period of
time as the linear decrease down to zero in sulfate emissions.
Here we examine the sensitivity of our results to the rate
of sulfate emission reduction by repeating 2010P3, but using
aerosol reduction times of 25 and 100 years compared to the
initial reduction time of 50 years (figure 6 and supplementary
material, available from stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/014012).
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Figure 5. The probability of exceeding three different temperature thresholds. The left-hand panels show the probability of being over the
temperature target at times during the simulation. The right-hand panels show the cumulative probability of exceeding the target for a range of
time periods. In the right-hand panels the initial year (0 years) value indicates the likelihood that the temperature target is exceeded at any
point in the experiment. Results for the 2010P3, 2050E0 and 2100E0 scenarios are presented.
Sulfate aerosol forcing is negative and reductions in
sulfate emissions from year 2010 tend to cause a direct
warming. At the slowest rate of sulfate emission reduction
(i.e. over 100 years) the probability of global average
temperature being warmer than pre-industrial by 2 ◦C or more
at any time in the simulation is around 25%. Halving the
sulfate emissions reduction time to 50 years increases the
chance of exceeding 2 ◦C to around 55%. A further halving
of the sulfate emissions reduction time only increases the
chance of going over 2 ◦C by a further 10%. In terms of the
50th percentile warming at 2100 (i.e. for the probability of
exceeding temperature to be 50% in figure 6, top panel), the
range across the different aerosol scenarios is around 0.4 ◦C.
Further, the choice of sulfate emission reduction time also
alters the time spent overshooting 2 ◦C (figure 6, lower panel),
with the probability of being over the 2 ◦C threshold for a given
period of time higher for the shorter sulfate aerosol reduction
times. In the most rapid aerosol reduction case the probability
of being over the threshold has decreased by half over a
century, whereas in the least rapid aerosol reduction scenario
between 150 and 200 years elapse before the probability of
being over 2 ◦C is halved.
4. Conclusions
Previous work using simple climate models, or climate–carbon
cycle models of intermediate complexity, have demonstrated
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Figure 6. The upper panel shows the cumulative probability of
exceeding a range of temperatures at 2100. The lower panel shows
the probability of time spent exceeding a 2 ◦C threshold. The results
are present for three versions of the 2010P3 scenario with aerosol
reduction times of 25, 50 (the base case) and 100 years.
the potentially long timescales for global temperatures to
decline, even following large reductions in carbon dioxide
emissions. This is a result of particular importance to policy
makers, and especially if unwelcome or dangerous levels of
climate change are realized—it is necessary to know that it may
not be easy to return back to safer levels of global warming.
In this letter, our first key outcome is that we have increased
the robustness of this result by attaining it using the most
complex class of Earth system model, a GCM, complete with
spatially resolved carbon cycle. Indeed, our analysis with a
particular coupled carbon cycle GCM shows that, following
rapid decreases in emissions, even slower CO2 and temperature
decreases may result, compared to those previously published.
We recommend that our analysis be extended in future using
additional GCMs.
Next we used large ensembles of simulations with a simple
coupled climate–carbon cycle model, with each ensemble
member given a different parameterization and an associated
probability based on the existing knowledge base. This has
allowed probability estimates to be made for the amount of
time for which the global surface temperature might exceed
critical warming thresholds. We found that for a multi-
gas emissions scenario that peaks emissions in 2015 before
adjusting to a long-term reduction rate of 3% per year, there
is around a 55% probability of exceeding a 2 ◦C target above
pre-industrial levels. Possibly of more importance is that
we find a 30% probability that we would remain above this
warming level for at least 100 years, and a 10% probability
that the 2 ◦C threshold may be exceeded for up to 300 years.
This particular scenario has a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions approaching 50% of the 1990 values by 2050,
which we note is similar to the G8 statement in 2008 to
consider ‘the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of global
emissions by 2050’. House et al (2008) showed that further
emissions reductions beyond 2050 would also be needed to
limit long-term temperature increases and we include this
ongoing emissions reduction here too.
It is noteworthy that although our GCM simulations
suggest very little decline in global temperature during the
century following a 2 ◦C warming, the MAGICC simulations
show there are values of key climate parameters that do allow
a faster recovery. These more optimistic possibilities do,
nevertheless, represent recovery timescales that are possibly
long for society to deal with. This remaining uncertainty
provides extra motivation for narrowing the uncertainty bounds
on climate sensitivity, ocean heat diffusivity and the climate–
carbon cycle feedback. Our results also imply that we need
to focus future research not only on thresholds of dangerous
climate change but also on quantifying the resiliency of Earth
system components (such as the Greenland ice sheet, major
ecosystems or the thermohaline circulation) to temporarily
exceeding critical thresholds for a range of different periods.
In adaptation cost benefit analysis, it may be appropriate to
consider the extra costs of temporarily adapting to levels above
an eventual desired target temperature, with analyses of the
type we present here providing estimates of timescales above
such targets. That such temporary resilience is important
to assess was shown in earlier work, e.g. Schneider and
Mastrandrea (2005) and O’Neill and Oppenheimer (2004).
Here we have extended their concepts to the most complex of
climate models and, by using in parallel large ensembles of
simulations with a simpler climate model, we have been able
to place the ‘overshoot’ issue into a probabilistic framework of
direct use for future planning within the climate change debate.
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